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Abstract In earlier published work, Maes et al. present
a pay-per-use licensing scheme for hardware Intellectual
Property (IP) cores. This scheme focuses on the use of
IP cores on SRAM-based FPGAs and is mainly based
on the partial reconfigurability property of this type of
FPGA. Our work evaluates the practical feasibility of
the scheme and the accompanying architecture. As al-
ready (partly) indicated by Maes et al., their solution
introduces some security and usability issues. There-
fore, we present improvements to the scheme and the
architecture together with an additional method for de-
creasing the area overhead. The overall result is the first
practical implementation of the pay-per-use licensing
scheme occupying 841 slices on a Xilinx XC6S-LX45
FPGA. The small area overhead is mainly achieved
by moving the storage of keys from slice flip-flops to
configuration memory. Moreover, the implementation
would not have been feasible with commercially avail-
able tools. We use an academic tool that allows nested
partial reconfiguration and flexible IP core placement.
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1 Introduction and previous work
Hardware designs are made for a wide variety of ap-
plications. The devices for which these designs are tai-
lored, are also getting more complex and more pow-
erful. Additionally, the techniques available for devel-
oping hardware designs continue to improve and per-
fect. This makes the design of efficient hardware an
increasingly complex task. Rather than starting each
hardware design from scratch, reusing already designed
components becomes common practice. With the com-
plexity of individual components increasing, the mar-
ket of designing and selling Intellectual Property (IP)
cores has been introduced around the turn of the cen-
tury. With reconfigurable hardware, e.g. a Field Pro-
grammable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), these IP cores can
be implemented easily and dynamically. Moreover, their
reconfigurable property allows IP cores to be software
and/or hardware in contrast with the firmware updates
of microprocessors which only target software updates.
With the pitfall of loosing IP, and therefore money, a
number of solutions have been proposed. Simpson and
Schaumont describe an oﬄine authentication scheme
for embedded software IP modules in FPGAs [16]. Be-
sides this software-oriented approach, a number of hard-
ware solutions were proposed [5][6][7][9]. In [6], a proof-
of-concept implementation is presented to reconfigure
the majority of the FPGA such that it has a design,
containing a specific IP core. However, this does not
provide a flexible way of obtaining and implementing
one or more IP cores. Although none of the other solu-
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tions ([5][7][9]) were implemented in practice, the work
of Maes et al. [9] elaborates the most on practical is-
sues. Moreover, their work offers the pay-per-use fea-
ture where the system developer pays a price for the IP
core per device in which it is instantiated. The scheme
of Maes et al. is based on the property of FPGAs to
support partial and dynamic reconfiguration.
Although Maes et al. worked out their pay-per-use
licensing scheme to a detailed level, it still leaves con-
siderable practical aspects untouched. In this paper,
we evaluate the practical feasibility of their scheme.
As already partly indicated by the authors of [9], the
proposed architecture is vulnerable for side-channel at-
tacks. Additionally, commercially available tools do not
allow nested and flexible placement of IP cores. We
present an improved scheme and architecture that give
a solution to the nesting and flexibility issues. In addi-
tion, we describe a novel technique to decrease the area
overhead. In order to achieve a more secure, practically
implementable, and smaller solution, we use a tool flow
based on the academic tool: GoAhead [1]. The result is
a working FPGA implementation with a small overhead
in area. This is the first implementation of a pay-per-
use licensing scheme for hardware IP cores.
This paper first describes the Xilinx SRAM-based
FPGAs in Sect.2 to introduce or refresh the readers
comprehension of FPGAs. Subsequently, this work gives
an overview of the original licensing scheme and the is-
sues it introduces in Sect. 3. The implementation of
the scheme, including the solutions to the problems
and a modified version of the scheme, are thoroughly
explained in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 gives the results
of the prototype implementation and Sect. 6 concludes
this work.
2 The Xilinx SRAM-based FPGA in a nutshell
2.1 The FPGA chip
An FPGA can be seen as dual-layer chip consisting of
the reconfigurable fabric and the configuration memory.
Depending on the technology used for storing the con-
figuration bits, the three most common technologies for
FPGAs are: SRAM-based, Flash-based and antifuse-
based FPGAs. For more information and a comparison
between these technologies we refer to [3]. The work
of Maes et al. [9], hence this work as well, focuses on
Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs. The reconfigurable fabric
mainly consists of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs)
and routing components, where the CLBs contain Look-
Up Tables (LUTs), multiplexers and flip-flops. The out-
put of a LUT can be configured to any function of the
LUT’s inputs. Furthermore, next to flip-flops, there are
two types of storage primitives: Block RAMs and dis-
tributed memory. Block RAM (BRAM) is a dedicated
memory component on the silicon of the FPGA. Dis-
tributed RAM consists of a combination of many small
RAM blocks in the LUTs. while the flip-flops provide
storage. The routing components in the reconfigurable
fabric are use to achieve the desired routing.
2.2 The FPGA configuration
To configure an FPGA with a certain design a ‘bit-
stream’ is to be created first. The different steps in
generatring a bitstream for a Spartan-6 FPGA are done
through the ISE design software of Xilinx. Their current
tool, Vivado, does not provide support for Spartan-6
devices and is hence not used.
The first step is to describe the design in a Hardware
Description Language (HDL), like VHDL or Verilog, or
through schematic entry. The design has to go through
the synthesis tool to be transformed into a netlist .ngc.
This netlist then gets combined with any other cores in
the Build step, which results in a .ngd file. This .ngd file
contains a logical description in terms of logic elements
like AND gates, flip-flops, and similar gates. Thereafter,
this .ngd file gets mapped on the hardware primitives,
which are the building blocks of the reconfigurable fab-
ric of the targeted FPGA, resulting in a .ncd file. The
subsequent step is to place and route the mapped de-
sign. Placing is determining where each primitive of the
mapping phase is placed in the chip, while routing tries
to make every required connection through the routing
lines on the chip. These steps result in in a routed .ncd
file which, finally, can be used to generate a bitstream
for the FPGA.
By loading the configuration memory with a bit-
stream, the behavior of the reconfigurable fabric is de-
termined. Commonly an FPGA is configured in its en-
tirety, but partial reconfiguration is a technique that
allows the reconfiguration of a certain partition of an
FPGA. A bitstream that contains the configuration of
a partition of the FPGA is referred to as a partial
bitstream. The partition that stays unchanged is re-
ferred to as the ‘static partition’ while the one or more
other partitions are referred to as ‘reconfigurable parti-
tions’. If the operation of the static partition continues
uninterruptedly during the reconfiguration of a recon-
figurable partition, this is referred to as ‘dynamic’ re-
configuration. The possibility exists to use encrypted
bitstreams to configure FPGAs. An on-chip decryption
core is present to perform bitstream decryption, but up
to the latest Xilinx series [19] this feature is not avail-
able for partial bitstreams. Moreover, this decryption
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core is not available for any purpose other than bit-
stream decryption.
To access the configuration memory from the recon-
figurable fabric only the Internal Configuration Access
Port (ICAP) primitive provides an interface. Reading
back as well as writing the configuration memory can
be performed through the ICAP. Note that the ICAP
even allows read-back if the FPGA was configured with
an encrypted bitstream. The storage of the encryption
key and the Initial Value can be done in battery-backed
RAM (BBRAM) or in eFUSE. The former is preferred
over the latter because the eFUSE can be erased [20].
Table 1 summarizes which recent Xilinx FPGA fam-
ilies offer certain features. This table learns that au-
thentication, which guarantees the FPGA configuration
is not tampered with, is only available on the most re-
cent devices. All device families mentioned in Table 1
can be partially reconfigured using the vendor tools,
except the Spartan 6 family.
3 The original licensing scheme and
architecture
This section summarizes the relevant parts of the li-
censing scheme presented in [9], discusses the originally
proposed architecture, and points out the possible se-
curity and usability issues.
3.1 The original licensing xcheme
There are four entities that participate in the scheme:
the FPGA vendor (FV), the metering authority (MA),
the IP core vendor (CV) and the system developer (SD).
The interactions between the different entities are shown
in Fig. 1. The scheme consists of an initialization phase
and a design phase. Both are described below in detail.
3.1.1 Initialization phase
When the FPGA vendor produces an FPGA F ∗i , the
device can be sent to a metering authority for registra-
tion (transaction 1 in Fig. 1). The metering authority
generates a random device key kFi and metering key
kMi and stores these keys in a database together with
the ID of the FPGA: ID(F i). Further, the metering
authority stores the device key kFi in the secure non-
volatile memory of the FPGA. The metering authority
will additionally perform an encryption of a bitstream,
using the key kFi . This bitstream is called the meter-
ing bitstream and it contains the metering design M
which includes a register that stores the metering key
kMi . The metering bitstream Bi(M,k
M
i ) is computed as
./licScheme_scheme.pdf
Fig. 1 Interactions between the entities in [9], where FV,
MA, CV and SD stand for FPGA vendor, metering authority,
IP core vendor and system developer, respectively.
Bi(M,k
M
i ) = Enc[b(M,k
M
i )]kFi , where Enc[x]y stands
for a symmetric encryption of x using key y; and b(x, y)
stands for a plaintext bitstream that implements hard-
ware components x and y. The uninitialized FPGA F ∗i
is now transformed into a registered FPGA Fi, which
is handed back to the FPGA vendor, together with
Bi(M,k
M
i ) (transaction 2 in Fig. 1).
When a system developer buys an FPGA, possibly
as component on a development board, which is enabled
to use the licensing scheme, the FPGA Fi is delivered,
together with Bi(M,k
M
i ) (transaction 3 in Fig. 1).
IP core providers also need to register their cores
through the metering authority. They have to register
every offered IP core by providing the metering author-
ity with an ID of the IP core, ID(IP j), together with
a key, kIPj (transaction 4 in Fig. 1). Both the metering
authority and the IP core provider store ID(IP j) and
kIPj in a database.
3.1.2 Design phase
When a system developer wants to obtain and use an
IP core in a specific FPGA, the following interactions
occur. The system developer requests the IP core iden-
tified by ID(IP j) from the IP core vendor (transaction 5
in Fig. 1). This results in the IP core vendor sending the
bitstream of the IP core to the system developer, en-
crypted with the key kIPj , i.e. B(IPj) = Enc[b(IPj)]kIPj
(transaction 6 in Fig. 1). After transactions 5 and 6 the
system developer cannot use the IP core because the
decryption key is not yet available.
4 Jo Vliegen et al.
Table 1 Feature overview of recent Xilinx FPGAs
Virtex-4 Virtex-6
feature & Spartan-6 &
Virtex-5 7-series
year of commercial release 2004 & 2006 2009 2010 & 2011
encrypted full bitstream AES256 AES2561 AES256
encrypted partial bitstream no no no
key storage BBRAM BBRAM / eFUSE BBRAM / eFUSE
ICAP readback with encrypted bitstream yes yes yes
ICAP support with encrypted bitstream yes2 yes yes
bitstream authentication no no HMAC
1 not in LX, SX and FX12
2 for Virtex-4: only in LX75(T), SLX100(T), LX150(T)
When the system developer wants to integrate the
core in his design, the IDs of the FPGA (ID(F i)) and
the IP core (ID(IP j)) are sent to the metering authority
(transaction 7 in Fig. 1). The metering authority gener-
ates a license KIPi,j , with K
IP
i,j = Enc[k
IP
j ]kMi , which is
sent to the system developer (transaction 8 in Fig. 1).
The system developer then configures the FPGA Fi
with bitstream Bi(M,k
M
i ), which allows the key k
M
i
to get on the FPGA without another entity being able
to read that key. Using kMi , the system decrypts the
license (KIPi,j ) to obtain k
IP
j , which is used to decrypt
the encrypted IP core B(IPj) on the FPGA, in order to
configure the IP core in the system developer’s design
through partial reconfiguration.
3.2 The original architecture
During the design phase, after all transactions in Fig. 1
have been performed, the architecture implemented on
the FPGA is altered a few times. This is depicted in
Fig. 2, where the white area represents the reconfig-
urable resources of the FPGA, while the gray area holds
additional dedicated components available on the die of
the FPGA. It is pointed out that the ICAP is perma-
nently present in the reconfigurable part. In every step
of Fig. 2 incoming data is used to update registers or
to reconfigure the FPGA. The targeted components of
the incoming data are indicated by the bold arrows.
The top image visualizes how Bi(M,k
M
i ) configures
the metering design and the metering key in the FPGA
through a full configuration. This configuration uses the
on-chip bitstream decryption core which is available on
the FPGA, using the key kFi , which is stored in Non-
Volatile Memory (NVM). The partial reconfigurations
of the FPGA that follow in a later phase, do not alter
the metering design. Therefore, we refer to the part of
the FPGA that holds the metering design as the ’static
part’, while the rest of the FPGA is reserved for the
system developer’s design together with the IP cores.
./act_seq-crop.pdf
Fig. 2 The evolution of the FPGA architecture in [9] during
the design phase. The Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) stores
the device key for the on-chip decryption core.
The second image in Fig. 2, shows the second step in
which the metering design, consisting of a custom AES
decryption core and two registers (of which one contains
the metering key kMi ), is already present in the static
part of the FPGA. The license KIPi,j is decrypted by the
custom decryption core on the reconfigurable fabric of
the FPGA, using key kMi , which results in the initial-
ization of the already implemented register for kIPj . It
should be noted that this step performs no configura-
tion, but the initialization of a key in a register.
The bottom image shows the incoming, encrypted
bitstreamB(IPj), containing the obtained IP core. This
bitstream is decrypted on the custom decryption core,
using key kIPj , and is routed to the ICAP. This results
in a partial reconfiguration of the FPGA to implement
the design of the IP core.
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3.3 Issues in implementing the licensing scheme
As already partly indicated by Maes et al., the imple-
mentation of the licensing scheme leads to a number of
practical issues. In this subsection we explain the two
most important issues.
3.3.1 Side-channel security of the embedded AES core
The original scheme uses the dedicated AES bitstream
decryptor in the die of the FPGA for the full configu-
ration of the initial system. In [9], Maes et al. already
mention the work of Moradi et al., that presents a side-
channel attack on the AES core in CBC mode [11]. The
attack reveals the key that is used to decrypt encrypted
bitstreams. In the licensing scheme, this means that kFi
can be revealed during the decryption of Bi(M,k
M
i ).
With kFi , the attacker can decrypt Bi(M,k
M
i ) outside
the FPGA to obtain kMi . This would reveal k
IP
j from
the license, which can finally be used to decrypt the
partial bitstream containing the obtained IP core. This
would directly lead to a loss of revenue for the CV.
Moreover, an in-depth study of this bitstream can re-
veal implementation details of the IP core. Note that
Maes et al. use a custom AES decryption core for the
partial bitstreams, since decryption of a partial bit-
stream was not supported by the on-chip core.
3.3.2 Nested and flexible integration of IP cores
As shown in Fig. 2, the metering design resides in the
static part of the FPGA. The system developer’s design
is a partial module that covers the remaining part of the
FPGA. Since the obtained IP core will be placed inside
the system designers’ hardware, the IP core needs to be
nested as a partial module inside the system developer’s
design. This requires the ability of performing nested
partial reconfiguration, which is not supported by the
commercial tools. Moreover, flexible placement of IP
cores is not allowed either, which means that an IP core
can only be implemented at a predetermined location
on the FPGA. Maes et al. support this by having the IP
core vendor tailor the obtained IP core to the system
developer’s needs. However, this slows down the design
time, increases the IP core price and results in a non-
flexible, non-scalable solution.
4 Improvement and implementation
This section explains how the issues in Sect. 3 can be
overcome. In addition, we propose a method for de-
creasing the area overhead of the architecture. Finally,
the novel implementation and tool flow are discussed.
4.1 Overcoming the issues
4.1.1 Side-channel security of the embedded AES core
The original architecture in [9] uses the on-chip AES
decryption core for full configuration and uses a cus-
tom AES core in the reconfigurable logic of the FPGA
in order to decrypt licenses and partial bitstreams, as
explained in Sect. 3.2. To solve the side-channel security
issues of the on-chip AES core, there are two solutions.
Either the on-chip AES core needs to be replaced by a
side-channel secure core or a work-around needs to be
found based on the existing FPGA technology. Because
the former lies with the FPGA vendor and because we
want to offer a solution for existing FPGAs, we pro-
pose not to use the on-chip AES core. Instead we only
use the custom AES core in the reconfigurable logic for
all sensitive decryptions. This core needs to be config-
ured in the FPGA which is done with an encrypted
bitstream, Binit, that also contains a connection to the
ICAP and a storage unit for the metering key kMi and
the IP core key kIPj . This static bitstream Binit is to be
generated by the MA and handed back to the FV when
the FPGA is registered with the MA (transaction 2
in Fig. 1). Next, the encrypted bitstream Bi(M,k
M
i )
is sent to the FPGA and gets decrypted by the custom
AES core. According to the original scheme, Bi(M,k
M
i )
contains a register that holds kMi , an AES decryption
component, and a connection to the ICAP. Since the
AES decryption component and the connection to the
ICAP were already implemented by Binit, the only new
component in Bi(M,k
M
i ) is the metering key k
M
i . The
encrypted bitstream Bi(M,k
M
i ) is decrypted with key
kFi , which is available inside the FPGA after the ini-
tialization phase.
Note that no precautions have been taken to pre-
vent an attacker from altering the encrypted bitstream
Binit through the techniques of Moradi et al. [11]. By
doing so, an attacker can modify the decrypted bit-
stream by making connections between the key storage
and the outside world to simply eavesdrop every key in
a later phase. Some tools exist to reverse engineer a bit-
stream [2,14], but these tools often focus on a specific
device family. The results of these tools look promiss-
ing but are not yet optimal and flexible enough to take
bitstream reverse enginering for granted. Therefore, we
do not take precautions to prevent this attack in this
work. The evolution of the FPGA architecture using
this novel approach, is vizualised in Fig. 3.
6 Jo Vliegen et al.
./act_seq_new-crop.pdf
Fig. 3 The evolution of the FPGA architecture in the im-
proved scheme, during the design phase. The KSwU stands
for the key switching unit and KStU for the key storage unit.
4.1.2 Nested and flexible integration of IP cores
Commercially available tools for partial reconfiguration
do not allow partial modules to be nested. Koch et al.
developed an academic tool called ReCoBus-Builder [8]
that evolved into the GoAhead tool [1], which allows
nested partial reconfiguration. This tool heavily relies
on the Xilinx Design Language (XDL) [18] to achieve
its unique features. Therefore, the use of the tool binds
the scheme to Xilinx FPGAs. Further, GoAhead also
allows the flexible placement of reconfigurable modules
in comparison to a predetermined location of modules
using commercial tools. This makes our solution more
practical, cheaper and less devious for both the IP core
vendor and the system developer. An additional benefit
of using GoAhead is that partial reconfiguration on the
Spartan 6 FPGA family becomes possible, in contrast
with commercial tools’ as mentioned in Sect. 2.2.
4.2 Additional improvements to the architecture
In order to decrease the resource occupation of the
static partition that handles the licensing scheme, an
alternative method for key storage is proposed. In the
original scheme, only the metering key (kMi ) and the IP
core key (kIPj ) are stored in the flip-flops of the FPGA,
since these are the keys used for the custom decryp-
tion core. The device key (kFi ) is stored in a memory
element that drives the built-in AES decryptor. As ex-
plained in Sect. 4.1.1 our solution uses the custom AES
core for all decryptions, which means three keys have to
be stored. Sect. 4.2.1 describes how traditional storage
of the keys can be done, while 4.2.2 explains how our
novel approach allows the storage of three keys using
only half the area compared to the storage of two keys
using the traditional method. Moreover, in the tradi-
tional setting, two additional reconfigurable partitions
are needed for the storage of the keys, while our ap-
proach does not need any further partitioning in the
static partition. This leads to additional savings in area
and timing, since the interconnection of partial modules
with the rest of the FPGA introduces an overhead in
area and timing.
4.2.1 The traditional way: key storage in slice flip-flops
Upon initial configuration, the registers for storing kMi
and kIPj are empty. During two partial reconfiguration
steps the partial bitstream Bi(M,k
M
i ) and the license
KIPi,j store k
M
i and k
IP
j in these registers. Assuming
AES-128 is used for encryption, each register holds a
128-bit key. Given that one slice contains four flip-flops
(for a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA), the two registers require
64 slices.
4.2.2 The improved way: key storage in configuration
memory
In order to reduce the overhead used by the key reg-
isters, the storage of the keys is moved from the slice
flip-flops to the “configuration memory” of the FPGA
by using the configuration bits of the LUTs.
Fig. 4 shows the architecture of a LUT6 which is
available in a Spartan-6 FPGA. This LUT6 can be con-
figured as a single 6-to-1 LUT or as two 5-to-1 LUTs.
Any function with n inputs can be configured in a LUT,
resulting in 2n possible functions. Among these func-
tions are two functions that map any given input to
‘0’ or to ‘1’, respectively. Configuring both 5-to-1 LUTs
through the SRAM memory to one of these two func-
tions, turns a single LUT6 in a 2-bit ROM. The value of
the ROM is stored in the configuration memory. Since
the AES core needs 128 key bits in parallel, we need 64
LUTs or 16 slices for the storage of one key.
As explained earlier in this section, there are three
keys to be stored, namely kFi , k
M
i and k
IP
j . By alter-
ing the truth table of the LUT-as-2-bit-ROM as shown
in Table 2, the single LUT can hold 2 bits of all three
keys. This means that the 16 occupied slices can store
all three keys. From a functional point of view, the
achieved behavior could be represented as shown in
Fig. 5. The configuration bits of the LUT determine
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Fig. 4 Architecture of a LUT6 in a Spartan-6 FPGA
the value of the three 2-bit ROMs and therefore deter-
mine 2 bits of each key.
Table 2 Truth table of the LUTs in the key storage unit
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 O5 O6
0 X X X X X kFi [n] k
F
i [n + 1]
1 0 X X X X kMi [n] k
M
i [n + 1]
1 1 X X X X kIPj [n] k
IP
j [n + 1]
./functional_LUT3-crop.pdf
Fig. 5 A functional representation of the LUT configuration
in the key storage unit
The group of 16 slices which stores the three keys
is referred to as the “key storage unit”. To prevent the
design tool from optimizing this construction away, the
key storage unit is implemented as a hard macro [17].
When instantiating the key storage unit, all key bits
are initialized to ‘0’. An update of the keys is achieved
through the reconfiguration of the 16 slices of the key
storage unit.
In order to be able to switch between the three keys
for the AES decryption core, the selection inputs A1
and A2 of the multiplexers in Fig. 5 have to be altered.
To be able to switch between keys through reconfigu-
ration, the same approach of using a LUT as a 2-bit
ROM can be used again. The truth table of this LUT
is shown in Table 3 and its functional representation is
shown in Fig. 6. The slice in which this LUT resides is
referred to as the “key switching unit”.
Table 3 Truth table of the LUT in the key switching unit
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 O5 O6
X X X X X X A1 A2
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Fig. 6 A functional representation of the LUT configuration
in the key switching unit
Combining the key storage and key switching units
would functionaly look as depicted in Fig. 7.
This novel technique of storing the different keys
also alters the protocol of changing between keys. In
the original licensing scheme of Maes et al. [9], receiv-
ing a new key occurs in a single update. This is pos-
sible because both kMi and k
IP
j are stored in two sep-
arate registers. Using the proposed technique requires
two updates for storing a new key: 1) storing the key in
the key storage unit and 2) updating the selection bits
in the key switching unit.
In the first step, the incoming partial bitstream (con-
taining the new key knew) is decrypted with the cur-
rently used key kactive and forwarded to the ICAP to
update the key storage unit. This has no effect on the
value of kactive, used for decrypting the incoming bit-
stream, because the key switching unit is not yet up-
dated. This first step is depicted in Fig. 8.
It is only upon receiving an update on the key switch-
ing unit, that knew gets used in the AES core. Naively
using the same method as updating the key storage unit
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Fig. 7 A functional representation of the LUT configuration
in the key switching unit
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Fig. 8 The first step: Updating the key storage unit
would result in switching the key during decryption of
the incoming partial bitstream. This corrupts the key
among other, as is depicted in the top half of Fig. 9. To
prevent this, the partial bitstream to update the key
switching unit has to be received, decrypted and tem-
porarily stored before routing it to the ICAP. Achiev-
ing this can be done by adding a FIFO that stores the
decrypted partial bitstream. This is depicted in the bot-
tom half of Fig. 9. Because the partial bitstream for
updating the key switching unit (1 slice) is small, the
FIFO is small as well.
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Fig. 9 The second step: Updating the key switching unit.
The top half depicts the naive approach and the bottom half
depicts the correct approach.
4.3 Novel architecture and tool flow
4.3.1 Side-channel robust decryption core
As mentioned in Sect. 4.1.1, a side-channel robust AES
decryption core is required in the novel architecture.
We follow the approach of Moradi et al. [12] in which
the authors describe a twofold contribution. First there
is the very compact implementation of AES and sec-
ondly have they implemented the threshold counter-
measure, presented by Nikova et al. [13]. With this
countermeasure, Nikova et al. achieve provable security
against differential power analysis and higher-order dif-
ferential power attacks. The discussion of these attacks
and countermeasures fall out of the scope of this work,
but the interested reader should consult [10], [4], [13],
and [12].
The very small overhead of this AES128 implemen-
tation is beneficial for our work as well. The smaller the
cost of the static partition, the larger the amount of re-
configurable resources for the single reconfigurable par-
tition. The countermeasure presented in [13] protects
implementations against side-channel attacks based on
logic glitches.
4.3.2 Novel architecture
The architecture residing in the static partition, han-
dling the licensing scheme, is depicted in Fig. 10. The
key switching unit sends the selection signals A1 and
A2 to the key storage unit in order to determine which
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of the three keys (kFi or k
M
i or k
IP
j ) is used in the AES
core. The output of the custom AES core is forwarded
through a bit swapper to the ICAP. The bit swapper
makes sure the bits of the decrypted bitstreams are
routed in the correct order to the ICAP. The need for
the FIFO is explained in Sect. 4.2.2. In our proof-of-
concept implementation, encrypted bitstreams are sent
to the AES core over a UART [15]. In an industrial im-
plementation the communication interface needs to be
replaced by an interface with a higher throughput that
is accessible through the Internet.
./static-crop.pdf
Fig. 10 The architecture residing in the static partition, han-
dling the improved licensing scheme.
Fig. 11 shows a floorplan for the nested partial re-
configuration of the FPGA. The largest block (Static)
consists of all reconfigurable resources on the FPGA.
The two rightmost components are the key switching
unit (KSwU) and the key storage unit (KStU). These
units reside in the static partition. The darker colored
component on the left is a reconfigurable partition (De-
sign), which holds the design of the system developer.
Up until this point there is a single static partition with
a single reconfigurable partition. The IP core which is
acquired for the design of the system developer is a re-
configurable partition as well, encapsulated in another
reconfigurable partition (Design). The first level of the
reconfigurable partitions contains the Design and the
second level contains the obtained IP cores.
4.3.3 Novel tool flow
Xilinx offers the PlanAhead tool for partial reconfigu-
ration. The tool generates a partial bitstream for ev-
./nested_PR-crop.pdf
Fig. 11 Graphical representation of the nesting levels, where
the Static partition occupies one level; the Design partition,
the key storage unit (KStU) and key switching unit (KSwU)
form the first level and the IP core(s) form the second nesting
level.
ery possible configuration of the static and reconfig-
urable partitions. For example, a design with two re-
configurable partitions for which the first reconfigurable
partition has two available designs and the second re-
configurable partition has three available designs, ends
up with six full bitstreams and six times two partial
bitstreams. Additionally to this large processing over-
head, generating bitstreams for nested reconfigurable
partitions is not feasible in PlanAhead.
In order to reduce the processing overhead and to
allow nested reconfigurable partitions, we use the GoA-
head tool [1]. This tool originated from the ReCoBus
Builder [8], developed by Koch and Beckhoff.
In order to reconfigure the key storage unit and the
key switching unit which both reside in the static par-
tition through partial reconfiguration, the key bits and
the key selection bits need to be inserted through par-
tial bitstreams. These partial bitstreams are generated
by making differential bitstreams with respect to the
initial bitstream, binit, and to b(Mi, k
M
i ), respectively
for kMi and k
IP
j . To use the technique of making differ-
ential bitstreams, first a full bitstream with uninitial-
ized hard macros for the key storage and key switching
unit is generated. Then, the second full bitstream, con-
taining the desired modification to one of both units,
is generated. Both full bitstreams have to be restricted
in the area which can be used. To achieve this, GoA-
head applies restrictions on the placement and routing
tools to force the exclusive usage of primitives in a cer-
tain area. The router tool has to generate routing in
this same area, which is achieved by blocking out all
connections outside the restricted area.
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The initial full bitstream is then generated for the
first placed-and-routed bitstream. Instead of perform-
ing the bitstream generation step on the initialized con-
figuration like in the traditional tool flow, this step is
to be slightly altered to make a differential bitstream
with respect to the initial full bitstream. This results
in a partial bitstream for the first level of the recon-
figurable parition which only updates the frames which
differ in the second full bitstream from the first full
bitstream. For more details and a more in-depth expla-
nation about generating the full and partial bitstreams
using GoAhead, we refer to the documentation [1].
5 Results
The architecture has been implemented on a Xilinx
XC6S-LX45 FPGA. The FPGA resources occupied for
the implementation of the licensing scheme, are shown
in Table 4. The table illustrates that the majority of
resources is dedicated to the AES core. Because the
system developer needs as much free space as possi-
ble for the implementation of his/her own design in
combination with licensed IP cores, the number of re-
maining resources available on the FPGA is important.
Therefore, the table shows the total number of rele-
vant resources for the FPGA we used for our proof-of-
concept implementation, but also for the smallest and
the largest member of the XC5V FPGA family. We can
conclude that the relative overhead in area is accept-
ably small, except for the smallest FPGA on which the
static partition not even fits.
Table 4 FPGA resources occupied by the licensing scheme
Relative usage of the
static partition in a
AES static XC6S LX
partition 4 45 150T
Slice FF 2486 3019 63 % 6 % 2 %
Slice LUTs 1729 2636 110 % 10 % 3 %
Occ. Slices 646 841 140 % 12 % 4 %
BRAM8 0 4 13 % 2 % 1 %
Next to the overhead in area, we also report on
the execution speed of the licensing scheme. A full bit-
stream for the XC6X LX45 has a size of 1’484’785 bytes.
The partial bitstream to update a key in the key stor-
age unit, including padding for communication and en-
cryption, is 2’232 bytes. The partial bitstream to alter
the output of the key switching unit is 1’432 bytes. In
our proof-of-concept implementation, a UART interface
with a baud rate of 115’200 Bd is used. This results in a
duration of 193.750 ms and 124.306 ms for the commu-
nication of the two partial bitstreams, respectively. For
an update of the key in the key storage unit, 140 AES
decryptions have to be performed, which takes 0.462 ms
(at a speed of 3.3 µs per decryption of a 128-bit block).
For an update of the key switching unit, 90 AES de-
cryptions have to be performed, which takes 0.297 ms.
In total a key update takes 194.212 ms (193.750 ms +
0.462 ms) and a key switch takes 124.603 ms (124.306
ms + 0.297 ms). In our proof-of-concept implementa-
tion, the communication speed forms the bottleneck. It
is clear that a communication channel with a higher
bandwidth is necessary for the practical enrollment of
the system. To place the timing cost of the presented
solution in perspective, we measured the duration of a
single, full configuration of the XC6X LX45 which takes
7.94 seconds. Assuming an IP core occupies 12.5% of
the device, Table 5 illustrates the absolute and relative
impact on the duration to reach to a working system,
with respect to a single full FPGA configuration.
Table 5 Absolute and relative timing with respect to a single
full FPGA configuration, for a system with 1, 3 or 5 IP cores.
Quantity for
duration 1 3 5
Operation [ms] IP cores
Binit 7940.000 1 1 1
KStU update 194.212 2 4 6
KSwU update 124.603 2 2 2
IP core 993.000 1 3 5
absolute duration 9.57 11.95 14.32
relative duration 1.21 1.51 1.81
KStU: key storage unit
KSwU: key switching unit
As could be expected, from Table 5 it is clear that
there is an increasing overhead with the number of IP
cores. However, this additional cost in timing is still
acceptable and could, in an extreme case, double the
duration. Obviously, this relates the number and the
size of the IP cores.
6 Conclusion and future work
This work describes a practical evaluation of the licens-
ing scheme presented by Maes et al. in [9]. We tackle
a number of feasibility and usability issues that occur
in the licensing scheme and the accompanying archi-
tecture. Further, we present additional improvements
that decrease the area overhead of the implementation,
where the novelty consists of moving the key storage
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from the slice flip-flops to the configuration memory.
The novel architecture was implemented on a Xilinx
FPGA, with a very small area overhead. The tool flow
is based on the academic GoAhead tool, that allows
nested partial reconfiguration and flexible IP core place-
ment.
Future work consists of implementing a state-of-the-
art mode of operation around the AES cipher. Such a
mode of operation can, additionally, provide data au-
thentication and data integrity to the conversed bit-
stream. This, respectively, encompasses that the FPGA
is ensured the data comes from a trusted entity and is
not tampered with during the conversation. The sec-
ond issue is the storage of the ’root’ key in non-volatile
memory. In current versions, this is based on fuses, in
future versions, newer technologies such as PUF-based
key storage could be used. Further, a communication
channel with a higher bandwidth and Internet connec-
tivity should be included to make the solution usable
in a real-life setting.
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